By on June 6, 2014

GM

As many of you know by now, the Valukas report on GM’s handling of the ignition switch depicts a fat, complex organization that is deeply broken. A company with so many incompetent cogs, it is incapable of coordinating a surprise birthday party let alone a conspiracy. And that’s the most alarming part of the report – that none of the employees appear to have acted in malice or colluded to save money or protect the brand. Instead the report paints a picture of apathetic, lazy employees and an even more careless litany of incoherent processes in the mission to detect and address vehicle safety defects.

This is far more dangerous than any calculated, unscrupulous group of executives colluding to hide a safety issue. Incompetency, whether it is in engineering, investigations or the administration of both means defects just simply go unnoticed and as such unresolved.  In terms of corporate responsibility it’s the equivalent of a juvenile “whatev” *shoulder shrug*.

While Ray DeGiorgio, the engineer behind the infamous undocumented part change, is mostly to blame for delaying the connection between the ignition switch and airbag non-deployments,  the corporate mentality that something as vital as your ignition turning off can relegated to a “convenience issue” is scary. But this applies doubly to NHTSA as well. Remember America’s vehicle safety overseer received GM’s TSB regarding the ignition switch in 2005 and gave it the government nod.

While GM is responsible for the safety of its vehicles should NHTSA share in the blame?

The Valukas report references a crash investigation conducted by Indiana University’s Transportation Research Center of a 2006 fatal single-vehicle accident involving a 2005 Chevrolet Cobalt in Wisconsin (pictured). The Valukas report says that GM had not seen that university’s 26-page report until 2014 even though it was found on GM’s servers.Crashed Cobalt WIS

The accident investigation was conducted at the request of NHTSA and references the 2005 TSB, confirms via EDR (electronic data recorder) that the ignition switch was in the accessory position during the crash and hypothesized that the ignition switch was one of two theories as to why the airbags failed to deploy. The other theory being that the first impact with a smaller telephone box may have signaled to the smart airbags that a deployment was not appropriate.

The team conducting the on-site investigation of the accident did not look closely at the link between the ignition switch and loss of power to the airbag because “such an undertaking was beyond the scope of this investigation.”  If the goal of the report was to determine the cause of the airbag non-deployment how could the relationship between the ignition switch and the loss of power to the airbag not have been within scope?

The university team provided the report to NHTSA in 2007. One page two of the report, the Technical Document Page, they state that the loss of power from a faulty ignition switch was one of two theories as to why the airbags did not deploy.  Did NHTSA take this and share it formally with GM? If not, why not? Are these reports reviewed by senior officials or are they simply rubber stamped and archived? Are potential defects identified referred from Special Crash Investigations (SCI), the division that requested this report, to the Office of Defects and Investigations (ODI), the group responsible for “undertaking” safety defect reviews? Could it be that NHTSA is as bureaucratically mismanaged as GM?

Keep in mind that unlike GM, NHTSA only has one single mission – oversight of vehicle safety. They are not surrounded by temptations like pleasing shareholders, cost targets or individual performance gains. Then again, given recent reports on employees at the Veterans Affairs Administration, maybe safety employees have some obscure rewarding metric on closing cases.

Last month the Department of Transportation Inspector General announced a review of NHTSA’s handling of the ignition switch recall among other things. In their review the IG should consider looking into the general information sharing practices between SCI and ODI when it comes to vehicle defects.

While the Valukus Report was intended to focus on GM’s handling of the defective part, it raises questions about the effectiveness of federal regulators who had similar (if not more) information than GM regarding the ignition failures and the non-deployment of airbags.

While Mr. Valukus and Ms. Barra will testify before Congress soon, NHTSA won’t likely be called to the Hill upon the completion of the Inspector General’s review. Depending on the IG review, we could learn more about if or how much blame NHTSA could share with GM in the timely discovery and remedy of vehicle safety defects.

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59 Comments on “Analysis: Why Isn’t NHTSA Sharing The Blame With GM?...”


  • avatar

    I’ve been saying all along that what troubles me is not a potential cover-up. Some people do, after all, cheat. What bothers me is despite statistical quality control and all sorts of processes intended to keep bad parts out of products, components that didn’t meet specifications were installed.

    It’s almost as if the very processes that were instituted to track down and explain problems ended up being a bureaucratic black hole.

    • 0 avatar
      SCE to AUX

      Quite right.

      Six Sigma still requires fallible people with expertise to produce good results.

      Otherwise you end up with nothing more than repeatable parts and nice-looking reports.

      I’m seeing it now in my company. The tools are endowed with cult-like trust. A debacle like this still may not wake up the Kool-Aid drinkers.

    • 0 avatar
      rnc

      I worked somewhere that was an automotive quality control nightmare (enough that I wasn’t signing anything that wasn’t financial related), some of the issues related are well known on this site, we passed every QS9000 audit with flying colors (remember hoping that one of those would kick things up so they might get dealt with, we had a lunch to celebrate the results instead). QS, ISO, Six Sigma, Lean and all of that stuff is great if used and applied correctly and continuously, unfortunately its often just used as window dressing.

  • avatar
    Astigmatism

    “And that’s the most alarming part of the report – that none of the employees appear to have acted in malice or colluded to save money or protect the brand. Instead the report paints a picture of apathetic, lazy employees and an even more careless litany of incoherent processes in the mission to detect and address vehicle safety defects.”

    Did anyone (well, any adult) really think that there was an evil cabal within GM that was plotting to cover things up for years while counting their filthy lucre? “Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity” is as true in the car biz as it is in politics or anywhere else. Enormous organizations, GM and the NHTSA included, breed this sort of thing and always will.

  • avatar
    jacob_coulter

    The issue is, did the NHTSA know?

    I think it’s one thing to know and purposely cover something up (what GM did) it’s another to just be another bureaucratic organization that was unaware.

    Also, if we’re to believe the outgoing CEO that even super-qualified Mary Barra who was a lifer at GM and was part of the management team “didn’t know” about it, is it really fair to say an outside bureaucracy should have known?

    There are simply too many accidents with too many variables to have a bureaucratic organization catch every potential issue with statistics.

    Government agencies are just incredibly inefficient and it seems they only create more issues by giving them greater reach and authority.

    • 0 avatar
      John Barnett

      Did they know the of the part change? No.
      Did they know the ignition had a 50% chance of being the cause of airbag non-deployments? Yes.

      • 0 avatar
        Sigivald

        Yes and no.

        I mean, you’re basically right.

        But “one of two options” does not mean “50% chance” – the presence of two alternatives does *not* strictly suggest equal probability (any more than three alternatives suggests they’re all equally 33%).

        (One can, I’m sure, think of numerous possibilities where two things are possible but one is *much more* likely than the other.

        *Retrospectively* that was probably the case here, in fact.

        But nobody knows that ahead of time, definitionally.)

        • 0 avatar
          John Barnett

          Right, but until you get into the probability factors given the elements and understand the airbag, it’s components (what works with power what doesn’t) you can basically assume one or the other. NHTSA didn’t do any work to determine which event might have even had a higher chance of causing the air bag non-deployment therefore I thought 50% was appropriate.

      • 0 avatar
        william442

        Ask them about Cadillac horns.

      • 0 avatar
        jacob_coulter

        I just think that’s a huge jump to say when an airbag doesn’t deploy, it’s a 50/50 chance the ignition is to blame.

        I can think of a multitude of reasons, and we’re also talking about a small sample size. There’s just so many variables when an accident happened.

        I think we’ve all known people that got in accidents that were more than “fender benders” yet they were surprised the airbag didn’t actually go off.

  • avatar
    mitchw

    Could the then serving political appointees at NHTSA have overuled the engineer civil servants?

    Hmmmmm

    • 0 avatar
      rnc

      Get the impression that’s aimed at obama, when the relevant dates above would be bush’s appointees?

      • 0 avatar
        jimbob457

        In my youth I was actually a supergrade in Washington D.C. It ain’t eggsactly the perfect system, but at least nobody can count on to be entrenched for the long term. Eventually, you will have to clean out your desk, and any serious bad stuff will come to light with the enthusiastic help of any of the lifers you managed to piss off.

        • 0 avatar
          Lorenzo

          Ah, but what if you played the glad-handing super politician and covered up bad stuff for the lifers? They’ll cover up the cover-up and give you a party when you leave. I worked in state government and that’s not unknown. Forget back scratching, mutual butt-covering is part of every bureaucracy.

      • 0 avatar
        mitchw

        Axshully, it’s aimed square at the cowboy one up the chow line

  • avatar
    Pch101

    GM is the automaker. It should get 100% of the blame for the failures of its products.

    Whether or not the regulator fulfilled its duties as a good cop is a somewhat separate matter.

    • 0 avatar
      Sigivald

      Seems to me that if we have an oversight body, it can only be effective if we hold it *accountable* when it fails to be good at oversight, no?

      Thus we should either portion out *some* blame for the *handling of the defects* to NHTSA or start talking about shutting it down as pointless.

      • 0 avatar
        Pch101

        Alan breaks into Bob’s house, and murders Bob.

        The cops know that Alan is a prime suspect, but bungle their manhunt. In the process, Alan then kills Charlie before he is caught.

        Are the cops guilty of double murder? Of course not. Alan is responsible for Alan, and he killed two people.

        Does that mean that the cops did the right thing? Of course not. But they aren’t guilty of committing Alan’s crime, and they shouldn’t be regarded in quite the same light.

        NHTSA didn’t build the bad cars. NHTSA can’t be expected to catch every problem, particularly as its staffing gets cut. The automaker is ultimately responsible for its own handiwork.

        • 0 avatar
          John Barnett

          Wouldn’t those cops, depending on how bad their bungling was, be repremanded? What happens the third or fourth time the cops bungle a murder investigation? Do you feel safe knowing cops in your town can’t stop murders from happening? You would say “Well, bad people out there. Not the cops fault at all.”

          • 0 avatar
            Pch101

            The nuance of this seems to be lost on you.

            NHTSA isn’t to blame for designing or building bad cars — it doesn’t either design or build cars. NHTSA is to blame for not properly doing its job as a regulator. Those two issues are not the same.

    • 0 avatar
      SCE to AUX

      I think Delphi should have something to say also. They actually manufactured the bad part.

      • 0 avatar
        highdesertcat

        I thought I read or heard somewhere that Delphi DID voice their concern about the internal spring or springs not being strong enough to keep the lock from jumping back to the OFF position.

        And I know that I read somewhere that the manufactured part met ALL specifications, at the time of manufacture, and for at least ten years after.

        The problem, as I understood it, was that no one, anywhere, connected the dots between “accidents where the air bags did not deploy and the engine was not running at the time of the accident and the ignition lock was in the OFF position.”

        • 0 avatar
          Lorenzo

          No, in the initial testing, the part passed all tests but one, the weak holding of the key in the “on” position. It was close to spec and the engineer passed it.

          Delphi probably monitors all GM and NHTSA issues involving its parts and voiced concerns to cover its butt. The problem remains with approving a part that didn’t meet ALL minimums.

  • avatar
    Zykotec

    As someone who may (or may not) work in a massively ‘fat, complex organization that is deeply broken’ (not GM, but not much smaller) I have no problem believeing stuff like this happens a lot more than people would want to know, even with things that are a lot more important and dangerous than a few million cars sold to people who doesn’t know there are other car manufacturers out there.
    Some problems may be linked directly to lazy workers, but often it’s the complexity of the system, and lack of communication between departments that makes it impossible to change/fix problems like this. People who understand how the internal parts in something like an ignition switch works, may not have any idea how a car crash works, or where the airbag gets its power from. And each department will often have its own budget so they keep tossing the ‘hot potato’ between them until it’s just forgotten, or lost, forever. (or until something awful happens that uncovers it)
    Add to this a bunch of people in middle managent that don’t even know what an ignitions swithc loosk like, much less how it’s built, but they know with alarming accuracy how often ‘Steve’ called in sick last year, and that ‘Jorge’ takes very long toilet breaks, and definitely that ‘Terry’ looks way to calm during the day to be actually efficient, especially since he also doeen’t fill out the forms every day in time, so that the middlemanager can show his manager how many parts were tested that day…

    • 0 avatar
      John Barnett

      Sometimes the complexity of the system is enough to push a caring employee into an apathetic employee. Why fill out endless forms to make a change here or policy adjustment there when I can ignore it or find a workaround.

      • 0 avatar
        Zykotec

        That is certainly true. A lot of the apathetic employees I know started our caring and trying hard to do their best, and then they were crushed by the system.
        There are (hypotethically) currently so many workarounds where I (may or may not)work that sometimes when we outsource parts they end up not matching what we used to make , because the ‘official’ drawings haven’t been updated to match the workarounds…

        • 0 avatar
          TrailerTrash

          But this is the very same reasoning used by protesters against large government. And the drive to enlarge government by THE government is the battle we have to face every day of our lives. This, like other battles, never goes away. It is one of the consequences of liveing..the battles of right/wrong/good/bad, etc.

          I guess the thing I am trying to say is we do our best…as people and as corporations. As a business you strive to become big, taking over market percentages. But this only makes the business management part harder. The larger, the more complex and the less on hands control any corporate head has.

          The BEST way to make a living today is to be a critic. Just go from one crisis after another and lay blame on somebody…that is where the steady and assured daily bread comes from. It s easy. You don’t ever have to build anything yourself and you will never run out of failure to criticise.

          • 0 avatar
            Zykotec

            I have to admit I agree with you too. We keep trying to do our best, to keep the customers happy, but doing our best at times means going against direct orders, and wrkign around problems instead of waiting for them to be properly fixed, which in turn makes the management think everything is OK, because there are too many barriers from the floor up to the top. So they think everything is working because of their leadership, when in fact it is despite their leadership…
            And it makes implementing any changes near impossible, well, I should just stop here…
            I’m a libertanian socialist at heart for a reason…

    • 0 avatar
      APaGttH

      Having worked at three fat, bloated, broken large corporations, I agree – this is way more commonplace than people think – or would want to know.

      • 0 avatar
        highdesertcat

        It isn’t limited to civilian corporations. It may even be worse in the military, for career military men and women.

        It’s really difficult to sell higher management on anything because the farther they are removed from the actual situation, the less interested they become.

  • avatar
    DenverMike

    So GM’s defense will be, “Hey we’re not just lackadaisical about safety, we’re lackadaisical about EVERYTHING!!!”

  • avatar
    APaGttH

    In the Wisconsin crash, since CNN shared the details.

    The driver involved was speeding in rainy conditions in the dark. The car was going 58 MPH according to the onboard data recorder when it stopped recording data.

    The state police concluded that the cause of the accident was hydroplaning caused to excessive speed for the conditions. The picture speak to a very high speed collision into trees, with near complete failure of the passenger cabin both driver and passenger side.

    Even with air bags deployed, it is highly questionable if this was a survivable crash event.

    I’m going to give weight to the Wisconsin state police who investigated the accident in 2006, when bad ignition switches or run away Toyotas were not even a twinkle in a reporters eye. They would have had zero skin in the game in their 2006 investigation beyond, why did a fatal accident happen.

    I’m sorry for the family’s loss in this matter – regardless of circumstances the airbags should have deployed. Period. So GM has to take accountability here because they didn’t it.

    Whether that would have mattered one way or another is a different issue.

    • 0 avatar
      John Barnett

      Actually speed was measured at 71MPH but in the last two seconds leading up to impact speed measured zero believed to be from the key being turned to accessory mode zeroing out the reading on the EDR. The police report indicates the weather was dry at the time of the event but it was night time.

      As for the fatal injuiries sustained…
      It appears the unbelted passenger’s head was crushed into the dash from the force of the unbelted rear seat passenger against the passenger seat back. The front seat passenger’s brain stem was compressed and she received fractures of the skull and face.

      The rear passenger “ramped over the passenger’s seat” and striking her face on the windshield header resulting in a traumatic brain injury and multiple facial lacerations.

      While I’m uncertain to what extent airbags would have helped in this case, reading the report kinematics I’m certain that had the two girls been wearing their seat belts their chance of survival would have been greatly improved.

  • avatar
    DC Bruce

    Going back to Pch101′s comment: If a regulatory agency isn’t doing what it’s supposed to do, then what good is it; and why should tax dollars support it?

    I’m having a hard time understanding how this so-called “report” was deemed closed when it failed to identify conclusively the reason the air bags did not deploy and one of the hypotheses — that the ignition switch being in in “accessory” position turned off the airbag system — was eminently testable: by simply making a call to GM and asking if the airbag system is powered up when the ignition switch is in the “accessory” position.

    I don’t think it’s too much to expect someone at NHTSA to not demand a report that identifies to the greatest degree possible, the cause of the crash. It also seems like discovering the ignition switch in that position should have been a red flag. Obviously, a switched off engine reduces the ability of the driver to control the vehicle. Why was it in that position?

    Fortunately, the folks at NTSB who do airline crashes are much more thorough. Maybe they should give a seminar to the folks at NHSTA.

  • avatar
    Potemkin

    As a long time observer of the system from within I have seen GM change from an organization with pride in the product and serving the customer to a bunch of MBA climbers whose only aim was to get more for themselves. The mantra was “don’t do anything and you can’t be blamed”. In the highly competitive world that is GM admitting to a mistake means no promotion or raise. There were few acts of commission but rather acts of omission. Mary Barra sounds sincere, hopefully she can change the culture for the better.

    • 0 avatar
      highdesertcat

      As an MBA I can tell you that, unless the MBA is at the top, there is very little change any MBA can effect.

      Which also brings to mind that engineers with dynamite degrees most often work for……an MBA.

  • avatar
    pragmatist

    To much emphasis is being placed on the airbags, as if that is the key issue. First airbags are by definition SECONDARY restraints, seatbelts are the primary. If the accident was unsurvivable, neither belts nor bags are the issue.

    The real issue is the loss of control. If there were no loss, then the airbags would be almost a non issue. Drivers are getting more and more removed from control of the car … steering, brakes, throttle are now ‘inputs ‘ into the system, removed from the actual process of control.

    • 0 avatar
      John Barnett

      Frankly I tried to bring up the loss of power being an “OK” thing as shown in NHTSA agreeing to this being a customer service campaign. You are correct – airbags are the OH-SHIT BREAK GLASS safety device and a driver losing the ability to control the car is where the real issue lies. But again, NHTSA appeared to be OK with a campaign that allowed loss of motive power to be treated as a minor TSB fix.

  • avatar
    SoCalMikester

    how many pther parts have been revised by GM without changing the part number?

    if this was the only one, theres a coverup.

    • 0 avatar
      SCE to AUX

      The part number thing is a bit of a side show. It’s very common to retain a part number if the item’s form, fit, or function don’t change. “Making it better” isn’t the criteria.

      In this case – and in hindsight – GM probably should have changed the part number.

      But you’ll see many products marked “Rev D” or whatever. This isn’t a sinister plot, it’s just the engineering process.

      However, good inventory control demands that revision changes be managed. This means you can choose to exhaust old inventory first, scrap it, or mix them. Each disposition is appropriate for certain situations. But in GM’s case, they chose to mix them together – bad choice.

      • 0 avatar
        ExPatBrit

        Agree the part # change should be a rev not a new number.

        The company I work for sells to the military and the car companies, we can usually squeeze a “REV” change “under the radar” a new model or part # might need re-qualification which can be $$$$$$.

        Just changing one of our products from “ink marked” to laser engraved took 1 year. No functional change at all.

        Unfortunately this requirements kills innovation. I can see why it happened at GM, I get requests for parts last redesigned 20 years ago, even though I usually have a cheaper, more reliable, drop-in replacement the buyer will insist on the legacy item.

    • 0 avatar
      highdesertcat

      I ran across this revised part number thing when searching for a Low Pressure Shut Off Sensor for the AC system in my buddy’s 1993 S-10 4.3.

      Everyone we ordered from kept sending us a switch that was twice the size of the original S-10 sensor.

      Finally, in disgust, we had to go to the GM dealer, with the switch in hand, at which time the part-ordering dude said, “We don’t make that one any more, but I may have one laying around in the parts bin.”

      The old part number was tied to a new part that didn’t even come close to fitting the application for the old part..

      • 0 avatar
        SCE to AUX

        Your story describes a situation where Form and Fit were different, even if Function remained the same. There should have been a new part number.

    • 0 avatar

      Every mfg upgrades, supersedes parts ALL the time. For supplier change, country of origin, more often than not even to raise the price. For GM NOT to have upgraded and superseded a part as critical as the friggin IGNITION switch, which IGNITES the car is beyond irresponsible.

      Maybe they should have kept(never-mentioned on TTAC) SAAB (and lost ALL of their pretentious loser brands), whose non-recalled Delphi ignition switches have been quite reliable (and never fatal) for decades.

      Oh well. The floggings will continue until the morale improves.

      • 0 avatar
        shaker

        Aren’t SAAB ignition switches mounted horizontally in the console between the front seats? Ironically, this would have been a “solution” to the GM ignition switch issue, since a bunch of junk on the keychain wouldn’t be tugging the switch towards the “off” position.

        Anyway, it almost begs the question: Should airbags be enabled to deploy when the vehicle is moving over a certain speed, regardless of the position of the ignition switch?

  • avatar
    cartunez

    Because you can’t blame your overlords oops I am your duly elected officials. Just remember the government is in place to help you.

  • avatar
    zerofoo

    I laugh when anyone suggests that any government bureaucracy should be effective in detecting and preventing problems.

    Government regulations, usually are created out of necessity. Someone, somewhere screws up, and then a government agency adopts policies and procedures to prevent it from happening again.

    The housing bubble and crash, 9-11, Toyota and GM’s auto recalls, Bernie Madoff…on and on and on. These spectacular failures all resulted in related regulatory agencies adopting new policies to prevent this stuff from happening again.

    Unfortunately, these are reactionary policies. Regulatory bodies aren’t very good at predicting the future, so they go with what they know.

    Which works, until someone screws up badly in a very unique way, that no one has ever seen before.

    No matter how well NHTSA learns from this debacle, another car company will kill a bunch of people in yet another new way, and the government will adopt more regulatory policies.

    You can bet on it.

  • avatar
    50merc

    Folks, stop! Just stop commenting until you’ve read the report. Too many of you are making erroneous assumptions about what happened. The report is long, but it is a remarkable document that explains the many things–intentional and unintentional–that contributed to the ignition switch debacle. I’ll be surprised if Harvard Business School doesn’t add the report to its catalog of case studies.

    Ray DiGeorgio’s disguising of the redesign in 2007 was the primary obstacle for GM’s trouble-shooters in determining why pre-2007 Cobalts crashed. It reminds me of the great prison riot Oklahoma’smain penitentiary suffered years ago, leaving many hurt or dead and buildings in ruins. The riot was touched off when the supper cart ran out of cheeseburgers and the server refused to do anything for the cheeseburger-less inmates. As a Corrections official told me later, the first question he asked in reviewing the incident was “Why didn’t you just go get some more cheeseburgers?” Ray, why didn’t you just tell your colleagues you changed the spring and plunger?

    • 0 avatar

      Or, “Ray, why wasn’t the part designed and built properly in the first place?” Failing to change the number made it harder for others to troubleshoot the issue but DiGeorgio more or less approved a defective part and Delphi knew they were shipping a defective part years before the redesign.

      I hate to keep beating the same drum but I still think not enough attention is being focused on the fact that people at both Delphi and GM knew the switch didn’t meet torque specs even before the part went into production more than a decade ago.

    • 0 avatar
      anomaly149

      It looks like GM’s change control system stonewalled Delphi and DiGeorgio until they just said screw it and forced the change through the backdoor. I’m guessing cross-car change control bitched about price.

      On the one hand, he stopped the flow of bad parts out the door. On the other hand, it frustrated investigators since GM’s systems showed no changes. On the third hand, did no one on the investigative team think to go to Delphi and pour over their changes? They had to manufacture the thing, it ought to show up like a spotlight in their documentation. Suppliers play games all the time, and everyone just figured they’d just assume GM’s and the supplier’s systems matched?

      Expect new NHSTA rules about airbags deploying in “accessory”.

  • avatar

    What would you do if you were driving and suddenly lost all engine power?

    I know that I’d check my gauges, slip the transmission into neutral (or disengage the clutch) and try to restart the engine.

    I wonder in how many of the accidents related to this switch did the driver know the engine was shut off?

    • 0 avatar
      ExPatBrit

      Unfortunately we have determined that losing powered accessories is a reason to crash.

      So fuel pump quits, engine stops, no power steering BOOM! Nothing the driver could do!

      This is setting an awful precedent, the owners of those vehicles stalled on the shoulder most mornings (just quit running for no reason) can now call their lawyers about their defective vehicle instead of AAA.

  • avatar
    dantes_inferno

    > Analysis: Why Isn’t NHTSA Sharing The Blame With GM?

    Because they can.

  • avatar
    ABankThatMakesCars

    What I don’t understand is why everyone is only focused on GM Engineering. GM is a Finance driven company. Finance is the one that creates the rules tying Engineering’s hands. Engineering doesn’t just not do the right thing. Finance creates unrealistic cost targets for parts. They create unrealistic rules as to whether or not to redesign a part or start a recall. GM Engineering wanted to do the right things, but Finance many times said no. Why do you think the cars were junk in the 80′s? Finance!


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