Abandoned History: The Navistar EStar, a Very Troubled Electric Van

Corey Lewis
by Corey Lewis

The plain white van you see here is the subject of our second edition of Abandoned History. Though it was produced and sold domestically as eStar by Navistar, it was actually developed in England years prior. In fact, the story of this electric van begins with the traditional black London taxi.

Since the early Seventies, the London taxi was produced by London Taxis International (or LTI), formerly a coachbuilding firm called Carbodies established in 1919. Carbodies was purchased by Manganese Bronze Holdings (MBH) in 1973. MBH was founded in 1899 to produce ship propellers, but the company gradually made its way into the manufacture of alloys, motorcycle parts, and then finally cars as parent to LTI.

Fast forward to 2002, and MBH sought to expand its business a bit with a great new idea: An EV cargo van! The project was dubbed eMercury and was led by LTI employee Jevon Thorpe. Thorpe played a major part in the design of LTI’s TX1 taxi, the then-contemporary black London cab in production since 1997. MBH got the British government interested in its new van idea and received some nice funding from the Department of Trade and Industry.

Thorpe and team set to work and debuted three different eMercury prototypes in 2004. Each prototype used a different type of battery: One was molten salt, the other a hybrid with a nickel-metal hydride battery, and a third used a lead-acid battery. However, by the time the prototypes were ready, MBH had a change of fortunes and heart. In 2003 MBH sold off the entirety of its components division, which left it with the LTI business as its only division. These new eMercury vans were no longer on their list.

MBH almost immediately announced that it would focus solely on its taxi business, and was selling off eMercury. The vans found a buyer in Jamie Borwick, who just happened to be the CEO of MBH from 1987 through 2001. Borwick rebranded and relaunched the van project in 2004 under a new entity, Modec Limited. Modec was part of Borwick’s portfolio of other companies, and part of the Borwick Group. The change in ownership also saw a new drivetrain developer for the eMercury, as Borwick used Zytek instead of MBH’s pick Azure Dynamics. The company’s commercial offering was called simply “Modec van.”

Modec began development of production vans immediately, and in 2006 announced a few new business partners. Among them were GE Commercial Finance which would cover buyer financing and van battery rental, and Modec’s sodium-nickel chloride batteries (Zebra batteries) supplied by Axeon Power.

Production-ready vans were displayed later in 2006 and used an 85-kilowatt-hour battery pack matched to a 70 kW electric motor (102HP). The Modec was good for a top speed of 50 miles per hour and had 221 ft-lb of torque. Range was about 100 miles in urban use, and total payload was around 5,000 pounds. The vans went into production in 2007 in Coventry, with the first builds sold to Tesco for grocery delivery service. Other UK buyers included city park services, delivery companies, and city utilities.

By 2008 there were 100 Modecs in existence, though the Modec factory was well below its 5,000 units a year capacity. Modec expanded to six dealerships open across London that year and set up distribution networks for Ireland and the Netherlands. The company had also secured a valuable large-scale commercial customer in UPS.

2009 was another promising year for Modec, as the company’s van was the first commercial electric vehicle in the European Union’s N2 class to receive blanket regulatory approval for sale across the EU. That meant sales were possible in all EU member countries without filing for regulatory approval in each nation. Shortly thereafter Modec announced a new joint venture with Navistar International, which would see the Modec sold across North and South America. And that’s where things started to go wrong, very quickly.

Navistar and Modec ironed out their deal in 2009, as Modec licensed its EV van technology and design. The newly-formed company was Navistar-Modec EV Alliance, but the name was a bit generous given Navistar made sure the steering wheel was on the left and called it a day. None of the van’s stats changed in the transition from Modec to eStar, but the batteries were supplied by American firm A123 Systems. The Modec was compliant with US federal safety regulations (FMVSS) without alteration.

Navistar manufactured the vans themselves via Workhorse Group, the Cincinnati-based EV company that Navistar bought in 2005. Navistar called the van the eStar and built it at the Workhorse factory in Wakarusa, Indiana. Production started in March 2010, and deliveries began in May. The Navistar project was partially funded by a $39.2 million grant from the US Department of Energy.

But the new JV didn’t help Modec’s sales in Europe. Though the project started out promising with 100 vans produced by 2008, the subsequent couple years saw Modec sales plummet. By March 2011 the company had sold just 400 total vans, and had debts of over $55 million. Modec approached Navistar to work out a life raft situation, where Navistar would pitch in and keep Modec afloat. “No thank you,” said Navistar. Modec started bankruptcy proceedings in March 2011, at which point Navistar picked up the phone and called the bankruptcy officials. “We will take that now,” they said.

Over in England, a new company called Liberty Electric Cars was formed and hired all engineering employees from the recently closed Modec. They set up a new subsidiary holding company, Liberty E-Tech, and reached out to Navistar to see if they’d be interested in the Modec team. “Pass,” said Navistar. Liberty created a service offering instead and called it e-Care, with the sole purpose of maintaining extant Modec vans around the world.

With their free government money and fire-sale pricing on all the Modec van rights, Navistar was set up for success. The first Indiana-built vans were sent straight to FedEx, where they were used around Los Angeles. Californian utility PG&E also ordered vans, as well as Canada Post, and Coca-Cola. Each van was priced at $150,000.

But the sodium-nickel Zebra batteries used in the vans were not as cost-effective or long-lived as the lithium-ion batteries found in modern EVs. To fully charge the eStar to its 100-mile range took six to eight hours and no less. Its design wasn’t the best for drivers hopping in and out either, as it had no front doors. The driver entered and exited through a sliding side door in the cargo area.

But none of that detail mattered much to Navistar, which was suffering from a failed engine strategy, declines in sales of its commercial and military lines, and rising warranty costs. The company cut its spending and product development considerably in 2013, and the eStar got the ax. The last vans were produced in late 2012 as 2013 models, as Navistar focused on its “current profitability.” Workhorse was shut down as a part of the cuts. 2013 also turned out as the end of the two companies that had to do with the original eMercury: Manganese Bronze Holdings went bankrupt and took London Taxi Company with it. Today there are just a few Modec owners on forums, trying to figure out how they can keep their vans with dead Zebra batteries in operation.

[Images: Navistar, FedEx]

Corey Lewis
Corey Lewis

Interested in lots of cars and their various historical contexts. Started writing articles for TTAC in late 2016, when my first posts were QOTDs. From there I started a few new series like Rare Rides, Buy/Drive/Burn, Abandoned History, and most recently Rare Rides Icons. Operating from a home base in Cincinnati, Ohio, a relative auto journalist dead zone. Many of my articles are prompted by something I'll see on social media that sparks my interest and causes me to research. Finding articles and information from the early days of the internet and beyond that covers the little details lost to time: trim packages, color and wheel choices, interior fabrics. Beyond those, I'm fascinated by automotive industry experiments, both failures and successes. Lately I've taken an interest in AI, and generating "what if" type images for car models long dead. Reincarnating a modern Toyota Paseo, Lincoln Mark IX, or Isuzu Trooper through a text prompt is fun. Fun to post them on Twitter too, and watch people overreact. To that end, the social media I use most is Twitter, @CoreyLewis86. I also contribute pieces for Forbes Wheels and Forbes Home.

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  • RHD RHD on Sep 14, 2021

    Add solar panels to the roof and sides, and the range problem will be less of a problem. (Your mileage may vary. Not recommended in Alaska or Tierra Del Fuego during winter months.)

  • JonBoy470 JonBoy470 on Sep 24, 2021

    These speed shops are operating without even the merest whiff of plausible deniability that parts vendors successfully hide behind. If the customer’s vehicle is registered, or arrives under its own power, it’s impossible for them to reasonably not know they’re installing parts that are illegal for on-road use, into vehicles they know to be road-going. Which is a violation of federal and possibly state law. To be fair, the guys who order and install go-fast parts from the Jegs catalog are breaking the same laws, but it’s a lot easier to fly under the radar, doing it once in your driveway, to your own car, than it is to do so to hundreds of other people’s vehicles, in an established store front, with a business license.

  • Redapple2 Love the wheels
  • Redapple2 Good luck to them. They used to make great cars. 510. 240Z, Sentra SE-R. Maxima. Frontier.
  • Joe65688619 Under Ghosn they went through the same short-term bottom-line thinking that GM did in the 80s/90s, and they have not recovered say, to their heyday in the 50s and 60s in terms of market share and innovation. Poor design decisions (a CVT in their front-wheel drive "4-Door Sports Car", model overlap in a poorly performing segment (they never needed the Altima AND the Maxima...what they needed was one vehicle with different drivetrain, including hybrid, to compete with the Accord/Camry, and decontenting their vehicles: My 2012 QX56 (I know, not a Nissan, but the same holds for the Armada) had power rear windows in the cargo area that could vent, a glass hatch on the back door that could be opened separate from the whole liftgate (in such a tall vehicle, kinda essential if you have it in a garage and want to load the trunk without having to open the garage door to make room for the lift gate), a nice driver's side folding armrest, and a few other quality-of-life details absent from my 2018 QX80. In a competitive market this attention to detai is can be the differentiator that sell cars. Now they are caught in the middle of the market, competing more with Hyundai and Kia and selling discounted vehicles near the same price points, but losing money on them. They invested also invested a lot in niche platforms. The Leaf was one of the first full EVs, but never really evolved. They misjudged the market - luxury EVs are selling, small budget models not so much. Variable compression engines offering little in terms of real-world power or tech, let a lot of complexity that is leading to higher failure rates. Aside from the Z and GT-R (low volume models), not much forced induction (whether your a fan or not, look at what Honda did with the CR-V and Acura RDX - same chassis, slap a turbo on it, make it nicer inside, and now you can sell it as a semi-premium brand with higher markup). That said, I do believe they retain the technical and engineering capability to do far better. About time management realized they need to make smarter investments and understand their markets better.
  • Kwik_Shift_Pro4X Off-road fluff on vehicles that should not be off road needs to die.
  • Kwik_Shift_Pro4X Saw this posted on social media; “Just bought a 2023 Tundra with the 14" screen. Let my son borrow it for the afternoon, he connected his phone to listen to his iTunes.The next day my insurance company raised my rates and added my son to my policy. The email said that a private company showed that my son drove the vehicle. He already had his own vehicle that he was insuring.My insurance company demanded he give all his insurance info and some private info for proof. He declined for privacy reasons and my insurance cancelled my policy.These new vehicles with their tech are on condition that we give up our privacy to enter their world. It's not worth it people.”
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