Last too long nobody will buy another one real soon. Then more often cars were designed for good times but not long time.
Another issues added to the equation is Japs car makers seem to have mix long time and good time together, so suddenly the big 3 started to look inadequate.
Now with more electronic Gremlins, it didnt help them to last long at all.
Excessive heat under hood also kill the electrical insulations.
Seems to be a norm for 4 cyls build by Big3s have weak head gaskets.

A fnd has a 90s Pontiac Sunbird, it needs oil &amp water pump , engine & trans mounts, shocks. newer Parts he found on the junk yards were much inferior to the ones on his car.
One thing u know the bean counters are very good at costs cutting.
While a mid or early 80s Jap or German car can still be functioning without great deal of parts replacement and break down.
The Big 3s had been digging their own graves for very long time, finally it has reach the bottom now.

So as mercedes build cars after mid 90s, they greatly water down the quality parts, and end up with a lot of repairs, recalls, died on the road.
Lately they kind of saw the deep spiral trend kind of bothersome too.

Progressive cultures emphasize the future; static cultures emphasize the present or past.

the car division managers are mainly merchandisers and dealer relations experts. … Thus, those who are closest to market and in the best position to influence future product development … and to design quality and efficiency into the product and process, and insure GM’s responsiveness and timeliness in sorting out emerging technologies and appraising their customer appeal, have little or no power and responsibility to do so.

Work is central to the good life in progressive cultures but a burden in static cultures.

The meetings of our many committees and policy groups have become little more than time-consuming formalities. The outcomes are almost never in doubt. The important decisions have almost always been reached behind the scenes before the time of the meeting. Accordingly, there is a dearth of discussion, and almost never anything amounting to lively consideration.

Frugality and investment are valued in progressive societies but seen as a threat in static cultures.

Management responsibility has become terribly fragmented and diffuse. Our executives do not make, and are not expected to make the difficult trade-offs involving market, technology and cost considerations. This fragmentation of responsibility in GM has had serious consequences. First, the executives in the vehicle groups have not been encouraged to develop real cost sensitivity, nor have they been empowered to control the variables which determine bottom line results.

Education is critically important to progressive cultures, but only marginally important in static ones, except to elites.

Very few of the top 500 executives are strictly professionals, i.e. executives paid and positioned chiefly on the basis of their judgment and expertise in such areas of technology as engines, transmissions, brakes, suspensions, process engineering, or overall product engineering. Rather young professional experts — our best brains in the areas of expertise that are critical to GM’s future — are usually forced by their mid-30’s to become managers if they wish to keep climbing the corporate ladder. Then after five years as managers, they lose their edge as professionals.

In progressive societies, merit is central to advancement but in static ones it is family and connections.

many top executives have tended to develop, like the rest of the work force, notions of entitlement, cradle-to-grave security, regular raises, — in short the club mentality: “I now belong to the club; if I don’t rock the boat and if I keep my nose clean, my remaining years will be quite comfortable”.

In progressive cultures, people identify with groups well beyond the family and into society at large.

we have articulated the need for a new global strategy: in terms of the allocation of capital, the sourcing of materials and manpower, and the marketing of our products. Yet, we still conduct ourselves primarily as a North American motor vehicle company with loose appendages in various parts of the world.

Ethical codes are more important in progressive cultures.

Most managers do not have the backbone to confront under-performers with the truth and take appropriate action, and even when they do muster the will, the system sets up near-insuperable obstacles. Over the last five years, we have averaged only about 100 involuntary terminations of salaried personnel per year based on low performance, or less than 1/10 of 1% of the salaried work force each year. By reason of this and the other aspects of our culture noted above, we find it increasingly difficult to attract, nurture and retain the very best talent coining out of the best schools.

Authority tends to be horizontal and decentralized in progressive cultures and centralized and vertical in static cultures.

Most of the top 500 executives in GM, until late in their careers, have typically changed jobs every two years or so, without regard to long-term project responsibility. In some ways they have come to resemble elected or appointed top officials in the federal bureaucracy. They come and go and have little impact on operations. It is the civil service personnel below them who actually run the place. More seriously, rapid rotation means that no individual is ever responsible or accountable for the success or failure of a project.

Progressive cultures are secular, with limited influence of religious culture and a high degree of tolerance of heterodoxy and dissent.

Our culture discourages open, frank debate among GM executives in the pursuit of problem resolution. There exists a clear perception amongst the rank and file of GM personnel that management does not receive bad news well. GM executives sometimes react to the presentation of a problem with visible anger and exasperation.

I see this all the time in corporate America.
Some idiot managers think they’re ‘high performers’ by forcing employees to work long hours for their own sake, not in order to accomplish viable goals but because it feeds their ego and makes them superficially look good to their bosses.

It’s the mentality of a bully and intimidator, and it drives away good people in favor of shallow careerists who like to play the same kind of games.

That seems to be a rather elastic definition of “quite successful.”

And once you’re coughing, there have been some plenty shady dealings between GM and their Russian comrades, including the murder of one of GM’s plant managers.

(cough)UAW(cough)
(cough)Cerebus [through GMAC](cough)

…and since I am hacking up a lung here…

(cough)Congress(cough)(cough)(cough)

It would be interesting to get an insider’s perspective on Ford’s culture, and ask whether its new leadership has really made a difference in this area.

Then we could contrast Ford to GM, to determine whether Ford really does have a better long-term chance for success.

If you mean that the current GM political system would reject fundamental change, because it would mean changing the game that placed the current people at the top at the top, then that’s certainly true.

1. Centralized hierarchy

2. Use of frequent job rotation to fill the top positions in this hierarchy.

You end up with decision makers who lack the general experience and specific knowledge needed to make good product decisions.

Executive summary of the report I submitted to GM in 2001:

http://www.truedelta.com/execsum.php

GM is far from unusual in this regard. I’ve been told by many people that my description of GM applies to the company they work for. This is a key reason changing GM will prove difficult: they feel the need to compete for talent with other companies that have similar cultures and systems.

GM’s problem: the weaknesses of American business culture don’t affect companies with simpler products to the same extent they affect the development of cars.

What must be asked, in the end: is a new culture capable of producing great cars viable within the American context? More broadly: can America produce great cars?

As was pointed out in teh CTS-V comments: the success of PVO suggests that such a culture is even viable within GM.

I’m sure I read that Harrison had tired of constantly being asked how the essays of “Culture Matters” could be applied to business.

Of the many attempts I’ve read, this is the only one I can say that works!

With the current goings on, it might be worth visiting the follow-on book “The Central Liberal Truth: How Politics Can Change a Culture and Save It from Itself”.

Thank you! This is America and I thought that America looks forward.

I’ve always been annoyed by the retro design themes….redesigned Camaro, Mustang, T-bird, Challenger, etc.

Trying to relive the muscle car era is like Al Bundy constantly harping about how he scored four touchdowns in a single game. Yes, we understand old man, you were great in the past….but what have you done for me lately?