Volvo is Latin for “I turn” (as in “revolving credit” of lore, or as in “revolver” for people who can’t get one.) Nomen est omen: Never has the word been truer than now, as the formerly glorious Swedish brand is being offered-up for a gang-bang.

From day one, TTAC chronicled the trials and tribulations of the D2.8 to sell as many brands a possible to the highest bidder. The news cycle on that is predictable. We report it. They deny it. Pom-pom waving bloggers drop their cheer-leading acoutrements for a second, wave the denials, and call us idiots.  Shortly thereafter, The Truth About Cars offered to India and China comes out, usually by way of the Indians saying that they don’t have the money, or the Chinese saying that they looked and lost interest. All while Detroit denies that anything of that nature may be going on.

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We made a huge mistake with our “SAIC may buy GM” story. We paid for our sins. The story created so much traffic that it literally melted two servers. TTAC’s China Syndrome. As you are painfully aware, TTAC was out of commission several times yesterday. A day after the story broke, the story broke our servers. Hit counters for all stories are currently SNAFU; they just gave up and went home. A huge amount of traffic keeps pouring in from China. And no wonder: a Chinese search for the same story produces 76,500 hits. If we’d run this story a few months ago, a wagon would have pulled up outside of TTAC World Headquarters, and they would have taken us away in straitjackets and a Thorazine drip in our veins. Now, a lot of people think GM is crazy for not doing the deal. A Connecticut hedge fund manager, who we reached for comment, looked at the screen, said “Ugh, the market is ugly.” When prodded to focus on GM and SAIC, he said: “If I’d be GM, I’d be in Shanghai right now, negotiating the deal. Then I would go to Congress and say: What are you going to do about it?”

Taking over GM would be just one in a long series of Chinese foreign deals. As early as 2003, Sinochem had invested $105m for the acquisition of gas assets in the United Arab Emirates. In 2004, Computer maker Lenovo bought IBM’s personal computer business for $1.75b. The Chinese consumer electronics firm TCL Corp. purchased the television business of French manufacturer Thomson SA, and with it the rights to the RCA logo. In 2005, China National Offshore Oil Company Ltd. (CNOOC) bid $18.5b, all cash, for Unocal. The deal was viewed as a threat to America’s security, and was withdrawn. Unocal settled for a $17b buyout by Chevron, in cash and shares, a good deal less than what the Chinese did bid.

In the same year, China’s appliance manufacturer Haier, assisted by private equity firms Blackstone and Bain Capital, bid $1.3b for Maytag.  Haier was after the same what SAIC would get from GM in spades: A household brand name, and a nationwide distribution network that could vastly expand its sales. The Maytag man in blue would have been a good fit, and the strategic importance of washers and dryers would have been manageable. However, political pressure did set in again, and the lonely Maytag man remained without Chinese company.

“In 2007, acquisitions in the United States by foreign ventures hit $407 billion, up 93 percent from the previous year, according to Thomson Financial. The top countries investing were Canada, Britain and Germany; the Middle East and Asia — especially China — are quickly catching up,” wrote the Wall Street Journal. Last year alone, China bought nearly $10b worth of US companies. The same year, China liked working with Blackstone so much, that they bought at $3b stake in the private equity firm. A $5b stake in Morgan Stanley followed. The buying spree was caused by the lower dollar. Since July, the dollar went sky high. But wonders of wonders, the Chinese did not adjust their currency to the higher dollar, in Yuan terms, buying American is just as cheap as it was.

Yesterday,  we discussed the huge spike of traffic with our friends at Gasgoo, in Shanghai. The same day, Gasgoo intensively grilled Philip Wylie and Joseph Gang, two leading professionals from Houlihan Lokey, U.S No. 1 restructuring investment banking firm. Said Gang: “The Chinese companies are quicker in evaluating and closing acquisitions today than they were five years ago. They have more capital from years of profitability and rapid growth in the domestic market to make foreign investments and many leading companies globalize through M&A which is a strategic priority.

“During the past one or two years, if we look at the larger deals in the automotive industry, you would find the Indian companies have been more aggressive in global auctions for controlling stakes and faster than Chinese companies. There are not many examples of Chinese companies purchasing foreign assets in the automotive industry.  The most successful cases involve Nanjing Automotive acquiring the MG Rover brand and related assets in the Europe, and Wanxiang acquiring multiple component suppliers through primarily minority purchases of distressed assets in the United States.”

“The operational challenges of managing the complexities of integrating a global business would not be materially different for any foreign companies, whether Chinese or Indian.”

China doesn’t like to be overtaken by India. Again, Chang hints what may be going down. China teams up with private equity firms, some of which it already owns: “For Chinese companies who intend to expand into international markets through M&A, it could be an alternative to team up with a private equity group for not only financing (albeit at the cost of sharing ownership), but also operations and governance support.” Translation: If a private equity firm buys out a company like Chrysler (as it happened), nobody cries about reds under beds. And it just so happens that China owns a good chunk of a private equity firm. Along with a chunk of Morgan. Along with a big chunk of the U.S. Treasury.

Today, the Straits Times reports that “China is now officially the US government’s largest foreign creditor after overtaking Japan, in a development that signals Washington’s increasing reliance on Beijing to save its economy.” According to US Treasury Department figures, China became the largest foreign holder of United States Treasuries. As of September, the U.S. Treasury owes China $585b. With GM’s market cap now standing at a pocket change rate of  $1.35b, and getting cheaper by the minute, China could buy 433 General Motors with their T bills alone.

Time for the United Auto Workers (UAW) to collect second-hand songbooks and ship ‘em over to their comrades– make that “union brothers” in China. Chinese taking our jobs? Wake up guys! Solidarity forever! The Chinese worker is taking it on the chin just like the working stiff in God’s Own Country. And let’s ignore the fact for a while that FICA, SECA, COBRA, and VEBA are not part of the Chinese language. PSA Peugeot Citroën, an affiliate of Dongfeng Motor in China, has “decided not to renew the contracts” (translation: has fired) 1000 workers on their Wuhan site, Gasgoo reports. Volkswagen, which depends on China for 15 percent of its worldwide auto sales, gave the Chinese equivalent of pink slips to 700 people at their Changchun factory. According to Chinese media reports, Ford, BMW, Chery, and untold more are busy. Busy thinning out their working masses, that is. Where did all the thousand flowers go?

Renault delayed their entry as a Chinese producer until kingdom come, or a turnaround of the world economy, whatever comes last. Even grimmer news from Chinese car dealers: 40 percent are losing money, and in a third of China’s car dealers everybody will lose their jobs, because they will close. Less jobs are yet to come.

The good new times are over in China. According to reports published by J.D. Power, the increase in auto sales has slowed down to 6.7 percent this year, as opposed to 22 percent in 2007 and 26 percent in 2006. An analyst at the usually well-informed Nomura bank in Japan sees China’s auto sales growth slowing to 3.8 percent next year, and 6.4 percent in 2010.

China’s car industry, which wanted to crank out 10m units by year’s end, recently slashed its 2008 sales targets to eight million, said Thomas Callarman, an operations management professor at the China Europe International Business School. This comes after a huge ramp-up of production in anticipation of unbridled demand. Callarman is chiding his Chinese children. “Two years ago, some of the same manufacturers were complaining they were already having over-capacity, and then they were building more capacity.”

Take that smile off your face, folks, this is serious. A concerned International Monetary Fund said that last year, China accounted for 27 percent of global economic growth. That’s more than any other nation. Hu Jintao, China’s Paramount Leader, agrees. “Steady and relatively fast growth in China is in itself an important contribution to international financial stability and world economic growth,” Hu said at the G20 meeting, pointing to China’s recent stimulus package. Even the grand Chinese stimulus package may not be so grand. Rumors of re-packaging of previously announced plans are all over the press.

The dire news even reached Europe. “We will see much, much slower growth in China,” said Ivan Hodac, himself Secretary General of the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA). In a rare case of economic insight, Hodac then prognosticated: “In an economic slowdown, automakers are typically the second sector to be hit after the construction industry, because, next to housing, cars are consumers’ most expensive purchases.” Never thought of that.

Not to be left out, Barron’s also weighs in on the issue. For some unfathomable reason, Barron’s is more concerned with ad sales of China’s internet portal Sina.com. Who’s to blame? “Autos, real estate and financial, the companies three biggest categories of advertisers, have all been hit hard in the slowdown. (If you thought China was immune, think again.)” OK, OK, we’re sinking. I mean, thinking.

As a sign that things must be as bad as can be in the Middling Kingdom, even Aljazeera finds the issue worthy of a closer look. Usually Aljazeera is an outlet for videos by bearded people living in caves in inhospitable areas of Afghanistan, and who employ pilots who can start, but not land. Now Aljazeera writes: “China’s industrial output has slipped to a seven year low as the global economic slowdown continues to batter the world’s fourth largest economy, eroding demand for Chinese exports and causing manufacturers to throttle back on production.” Their favorite video producer hasn’t claimed responsibility for that one– yet.

Even in the most poisonous flower is a little bit of honey, a possibly Chinese proverb says. After two months of decline, sales recovered slightly in October, rising 8.4 percent on-year. This only after Toyota, Volkswagen and others put piles of Yuan on the hoods of new models.

Long-term growth potential in China remains rosy. Only 20 people for every 1,000 own a car in China, compared with more than 500 per 1,000 in Europe and way more than 700 per 1,000 in the United States.  Once the Chinese can afford a ride again, they will buy. Some scholars of Milton Friedman and Darwin even think that the current “slow down now is to some extent beneficial to the industry because we’ll be taking out a lot of the inefficient capacity.” Roger that says Raymond Tsang, a partner at the consulting firm Oliver Wyman. He’s not alone in foretelling a consolidation amongst the 100 or so auto makers in China. Keep those songbooks coming!

Or not. Despite all the noise about a Chrysler – Chery hook-up, despite Chinese manufacturers' presence at the North American International Auto Show, we have yet to see a single Chinese-built (let alone designed) vehicle here in the U.S. So, are they really coming? The short answer is yes, some of them, eventually. But not for quite a while yet.

The number one reason we haven’t see Chinese (or Indian for that matter) cars on these shores: home markets. Right now, the Chinese market is growing at a rabid clip. Local automakers are more concerned with increasing production and filling newly emerging gaps and niches than sinking scarce foreign currency into expensive export drives.

Before Chinese automakers look east (or south or west), their home market must reach a saturation point– a pause that may take a decade or more to realize. Sure, they may dip their toes in low-cost developing nations, but the real action is at home. Taking their eyes off the domestic market is a one-way ticket to marginalization.

This brings us to point two: there are a LOT of Chinese automakers and just one party running the country.  

You might think this could lead to issues of favoritism, once some of the makers make the leap abroad. That ain’t the half of it. Being a single-party government does not mean that the government has only one thought process (look at Chicago). Any Chinese maker looking to dive into the U.S. market must trust that China’s government officials will go to bat for them in international trade negotiations.  At the same time, the automaker has to worry about all the officials they DON’T own cutting them off at the knees (or worse).

There’s an even bigger problem with cracking the American market: the sheer scale of the undertaking.

To capture American market share, a carmaker needs dealers, parts, lawyers (lots of lawyers), national advertising, administrative staff, buildings, food, someone to keep the U.S. government happy and God knows what else. These are huge sunk costs.

Worse, all of these capital costs, goods and services must be paid in dollars– one case where a Chinese company’s main cost advantage cuts back at them.  Toyota and Nissan took 10 years to crack the American market. Hyundai took about seven to eight years to gain a toehold. And those are the “successes.” The list of car companies who failed in the American car market is long and illustrious, including Fiat, Peugeot, TVR and many more.  

Of course the Chinese could get a partner. After all, there are plenty of “joint” Chinese/foreign companies in their home market (and a few pure Chinese ones). And yet none have brought a Chinese-made vehicle stateside.

Again, their recalcitrance may be a matter of rational economics (make money in the booming market, don’t branch out). It may also represent a lack of trust re: reliability/build quality of Chinese-made vehicles. The dearth may also reflect a desire by Chinese companies not to give their “partners” leverage– in case they try to “nationalize” the subsidiaries.

But the biggest inhibition is history. Emigrating as a “captive” import has never been a path to American manufacturing glory. Isuzu just left, Suzuki hasn’t yet (but no one can really tell), Renault/AMC didn’t exactly set the world on fire. “Going it alone” would be a dangerous path for a Chinese automaker, but it at least offers the chance of success. The major players make lousy pimps.

Buying out an unsuccessful U.S. dealer network would seem to be the quick way around many of these problems. The problem here is with what’s available, or likely to become available soon.  Isuzu’s dealer network was nothing to write home about: sparse, truck-centered and closely tied to GM. On the other hand, if Chrysler should go on the block, it would be if anything, worse.

The first problem is scale. There are far too many Chrysler dealers right now (it’s one of the reasons they’re in so much trouble). As they stand, none of the Chinese automakers could fill a supply channel larger than Honda’s (with two to three times the dealers). Also, any procedure that sees Chrysler go on the block is likely to void most of the dealer contracts. “Chery”-picking may be possible once the dust settles. But in that case, there’s little difference from starting an all-new network (certainly not in terms of cost).    

All that said, the Chinese may still venture stateside. Believe it or not, failure will signal their arrival. Sooner or later, the Chinese market will stabilize—or tank (saturation, outside economic factors, government instability). Once the domestic market cools off, an established Chinese domestic car company or three will fail. Some of the survivors will merge. Others will look overseas for their survival. Then, the Chinese automakers will finally arrive in America, in force. 

I once worked for a colonel who'd address all obstacles by saying "you can solve any problem if you throw enough money at it." While our budget officer would have to breathe into a paper bag for a half hour afterwards, the colonel always managed to squeeze whatever was needed to resolve the crisis du jour from the budget– and solve the problem. Automakers native to the People's Republic of China (PRC) must have bugged his office; they've adopted the exact same philosophy.  

Successfully implementing the "I'll buy what I need" strategy requires two things: 1) money and 2) knowing where to spend it. The Chinese automakers certainly meet criterion number one. The PRC is now the world's second largest auto market; auto sales are booming. The Chinese law requiring all foreign automakers to buddy-up with a domestic partner has delivered unto them an enormous financial windfall.

Criterion two– locating mission critical knowledge and/or technology– is a no-brainer. While there have been auto factories in the PRC since the mid ‘50s, the Chinese auto industry discovered the technological benefits of the aforementioned joint ventures (JV) since A Flock of Seagulls first flew. For the last thirty years, Western JVs have been flooding the PRC with new automotive designs, products and processes. 

Initially, these JV partners used Chinese labor to assemble automobiles already in production elsewhere. The Chinese partners learned how to bolt together a car, but not much more. By the 1990s and early 2000s, the foreign partners had started designing models specifically for Chinese consumption, retooling their plants for full-scale manufacturing.

At this point, several "independent" Chinese auto manufacturers (i.e. companies not enmeshed in joint ventures) began leveraging their newfound carmaking skills to send in the clones: selling exact replicas of other manufacturer's models built for Chinese consumers. 

Blinded by golden goosehood, stymied by laughable and unenforced Chinese copyright and trademark laws, GM, VW, Ford and others turned a blind eye to this sincerely flattering fraternal competition. Western automakers wrote it off as the cost of doing business in a military dictatorship. Besides, in China's burgeoning automotive market, there was– and is– plenty of pie for everyone! Of course, Chinese manufacturers had bigger plans…

For the last decade of so, Chinese automakers have started eying foreign markets. As they dipped their entrepreneurial toes into Western climes, they realized they lacked competitive cars, and the engineering expertise to design them. Disastrous European crash testing literally drove the point home.

So Chinese automakers have started throwing money at European and North American automotive companies. Michael Laske, president of Austrian-based AVL China, says "The Chinese fundamentally lack products and knowledge, but they need to get into the market very quickly." And so AVL is banking big bucks, designing an entire engine line from the ground up to pop China's Chery.

Companies selling world class technology in so-called mature markets are falling all over themselves in their rush to cater to China's hunger for the best of the best. The list of successful sellers includes BorgWarner (turbochargers, clutches, transmissions), Sweden's Autoliv (safety systems), Austria's Magna Steyr (marketing strategy, legal requirements), Robert Bosch (diesel technology),  Italdesign-Giugiaro and Pininfarina (design assistance) and A.T. Kearney (management consultants). 

The joint venture partners are infusing their Chinese partners/competitors with cutting edge technology. GM has an engineering and design center in Shanghai, soon to be joined by a hybrid research center. To provide Chrysler with a small car for the U.S. market, Chrysler's engineers are tweaking every aspect of Chery's operations. So what happens next, once this technology transfer is bang up-to-date?

China's domestic automakers will use their imported expertise to export cars abroad. Chery is already selling cars in Mexico; they've declared their intention to enter the U.S. market in the next two to three years. Chinese automakers will be out in force at this year's North American International Auto Show.

To further the cause of global export, the Chinese government is pushing their domestic auto makers to merge into a "Big Three" and a "Mini Three." Given the government's protectionist views, once the mergers and reorganizations are over, GM, VW, Toyota et al will find themselves out in the cold.

Western manufacturers seem blissfully unaware of their own usurpation. They keep pouring money and engineering talent into China– even as the Chinese manufacturers are taking the first steps toward merging into megacompanies. Once again, western car companies are so blinded by the money they're making that they can't see the dangers lurking beyond the next quarter's bottom line. 

But hey, that's the way the fortune cookie crumbles. If we don't do it, someone else will. Make hay while the sun shines. Pump and dump cuts both ways. That kind of thing. But any automaker that doesn't see China as a short term play, that stakes its long term financial future on the PRC, is headed for a rude awakening. Sooner rather than later.

By law, foreign automakers seeking a foothold in China must form joint ventures (JVs) with domestic "partners." As we've outlined before , there's an immediate downside: China's scant regard for intellectual property rights (IPR). For example, GM found itself suing Chinese automaker Chery (whose name middle-finger salutes Chevy) over the QQ, a blatant copy of the Daewoo Matiz. The case was settled out of court, but the issue of IPR remains unresolved. And now that Chinese automakers are consolidating and striking out on their own, what's going to happen their foreign partners and their IPR? What do you think?

China's three largest automakers are Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), First Automobile Works (FAW) and Dongfeng. SAIC currently partners with General Motors and VW. FAW is hooked-up with Toyota, VW and Mazda. And Dongfeng works with PSA Peugot Citroën, Honda, Nissan-Renault and Kia.

China's Big Three own almost 50 percent of the domestic auto market. All three have announced plans to develop "house" brands with independent intellectual property rights. As Chinadaily.com puts it, "After churning out Buicks, Passats and other foreign models in tie-ups with global auto giants for years, many home-grown players are setting their sights on an own-brand strategy, hoping to wean themselves off reliance on foreign technology."

To that end, SAIC has budgeted $3.56b over the next five years for designing engines and complete sedans, and building a technical center. The automaker's also announced a massive bond initiative to fund development of their new cars. SAIC is looking to build factories capable of churning out a quarter million vehicles per year.

FAW is set to invest $1.7b in new product development, production facilities and "229 key technologies" over the next eight years. And Dongfeng is spending $1.01b to develop their own brand of cars and a new assembly plant. 

SAIC has a head start on its domestic competitors. They already own the IPR for the Rover 25 and 75 models, purchased from the now-defunct British brand at the end of days. SAIC has used the technology to launch the Roewe 750 based on the (BMW developed) Rover 75. So far they've sold 8k 750s.

SAIC is also considering a merger with smaller Nanjing Auto, owner of the MG brand. Nanjing has started production at MG's former plant in the U.K.; they're setting-up a similar facility back in The People's Republic. It wouldn't be hard to use the car as an anchor for a full line up.

And it won't take long for the other Chinese automakers to catch up. Dongfeng has plans to market a self-branded sedan that "imitates" the Elysee (currently manufactured by Dongfeng Peugeot Citroen Co Ltd.), starting this September. FAW is ready to begin mass production of their first independently designed sedan engine. Entire cars will follow.

Clearly, Chinese automobile manufacturers are cashing in on their crash course in auto manufacturing. They've spent the past 20 or so years studying their partners' design and engineering processes and production techniques, and establishing their own relationships with suppliers. They've also learned marketing, dealing with export and import regulations, and all the rest of the finer points of selling their products internationally.

China's automakers aren't going to want to keep sharing a large chunk of what is now the world's second largest auto market. Over the next five years China's Big Three will flex their muscle to retain their 50 percent market share. Those automakers who've entered these joint ventures will have to pay the price.

It won't be hard for the home-grown tigers to ease their partners out of the picture. Some of the models produced by the JVs are a generation removed than the same model in other markets; they need updating. Without modernization, their sales will start to drop "as core models become increasingly obsolete," warns Goldman Sachs. If the Chinese partners won't allow the foreign partners to update their designs, sales will dwindle, opening the door for the Chinese partners to introduce newer, self-branded models.  

Since Chinese law prohibits foreign auto companies from operating without a Chinese partner, this "planned obsolescence" scenario would effectively shut out the foreign automakers. Even if China's Big Three don't starve their JVs of new product, there is no doubt that the government of China will do whatever it takes to bias the domestic market in favor of home-grown automakers, including (but not limited to) punitive taxes.

Although GM and others rely on the Chinese market to help keep them afloat, there's not a lot they could do about any moves to diminish their profits. We're talking about a country run by a military dictatorship; as the current legal laxity over IPR indicates, there's no chance of legal redress.   

Meanwhile, the Chinese automobile market is expanding. The foreign players are making hay while the sun shines, even as the storm clouds gather above them.

The Chinese automotive market has over a billion potential customers. Sales growth is well into the double digits. Labor rates are a fraction of those paid in western countries, without any union rules to slow down investment or add legacy costs. An ideal place for American investment? Depends on how you look at it. The Chinese market is controlled by a totalitarian government and regulated by an Automobile Industry Policy that’s more convoluted than a bowl of shahe fen noodles. As China nips at Germany’s heels to become the world’s third-largest auto producing country, let’s take a closer look at the sleeping dragon.

There are nearly 100 automobile manufacturers in China.  Ninety-percent of the market belongs to eight state-owned companies. To meet soaring demand for new cars, these companies have partnered with automakers from around the world. These partnerships can appear strange; one Chinese company may have several partners which are competitors in the rest of the world. Here’s the list:

FAW:  Toyota/VW/Mazda
SAIC:   GM/VW
Changan:  Ford/Suzuki
Dongfeng:  PSA Peugot Citroën/Honda/Nissan-Renault/Kia
Guangzhou AIC:  Toyota/Honda
Beijing AIC:  DCX/Hyundai
Nanjing AIC:  Fiat
Brilliance:  BMW

While Chinese law prohibits any foreign company (or combination of companies) from owning more than 50% of their Chinese partner, these joint ventures have proven lucrative for all the parties involved. The Chinese companies get access to the engineering and design expertise of world-class companies, while the partners gain a quick inroad to what is arguably the hottest new car market in the world. 

As the market has grown, a number of independent (i.e. carmakers who aren’t affiliated with a foreign manufacturer) local companies have sprung up. They are usually either motorcycle manufacturers expanding into the auto market, new companies funded by capital from other industries (such as consumer electronics) or parts manufacturers that started assembling their parts into complete cars. The primary independent players are:

Southeast
Chery  
Geely
GreatWall
Zhongxin
Jianghuai
Hafei

Of these, government–owned Chery is the best known– thanks to Malcolm Bricklin’s professed intention to import cars built by Chery under his Visionary Vehicles nameplate. While Bricklin keeps pushing back the introduction of his Chinese-built products due to quality, production and safety issues (not to mention a lack of investors), he insists he will revolutionize the American market with his line of low-cost, high value vehicles. Recently, DCX has also been negotiating with Chery to produce a subcompact economy car for Chrysler.

Chery’s other claim to fame isn’t so, well, cheery. They jump-started their production capability by buying the defunct VW factory in Westmoreland, PA and relocating it to China lock, stock, and tool dies. They then procured blueprints from SEAT for a car based on the Jetta and began producing a clone. (Jetta is the biggest selling car in China and the Chinese market generates almost 20% of VW’s pre-tax profits). As you can imagine, VW was furious. They eventually accepted a financial settlement in compensation. 

To expand their operation further, Chery began hiring engineers from other companies including Daewoo. Two new models, the “Son of the Orient” and the “QQ” were suspiciously similar to Daewoo’s Magnus and Matiz (sold as the Chevrolet Spark). Chery introduced the QQ six months prior to the planned introduction of the Spark, priced $1500 lower than its automotive homonym. 

GM accused Chery of “copying and unauthorized use of GM-Daewoo’s trade secrets.” Chery countered by claiming they had developed the QQ independently and with only “inspiration” from the Matiz. Since this “inspiration” consisted of styling so similar you couldn’t tell them apart from more than 10 feet away and interchangeable body panels, doors and other parts, GM filed suit.

After three years of litigation, GM and Chery finally settled out of court. While the details of the settlement haven’t been released, GM did win one concession: Chery can’t sell cars in the US under its own name due to the similarity between “Chery” and “Chevy.”

The problems with Chery underscore the sword of Damocles hanging over foreign manufacturers operating in the Chinese market. Any time you’re dealing with companies owned by a dictatorial government, you’re at the mercy of the whims of the political leadership. The Chinese government (controlled by the army) provides all of the information used for business planning: economic growth, per capita income, projected sales, etc. They create the rules for the protection of intellectual property. They control the courts that interpret the rules on the protection of intellectual property. They control everything within the supply chain, from labor to raw materials to retail distribution to taxes to traffic laws. 

Like China’s so-called citizens, foreign auto companies are completely at the Chinese government’s mercy. If China’s rulers decide to nationalize all automotive production facilities, there’s nothing foreign automakers can do but leave. Meanwhile, they’re making hay while the sun shines, doing whatever they can to make sure their “partners” don’t pull the plug.